In a shocking incident that stunned national security experts, the Signal messaging app, renowned for its advanced encryption, became the focal point of a controversy involving the Trump administration. High-ranking officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, used the platform to discuss confidential war plans targeting Houthi rebels in Yemen. The revelation surfaced after Jeffrey Goldberg, editor-in-chief of The Atlantic, was inadvertently added to a group exchanging top-secret messages, exposing what has been labeled one of the most significant security breaches in recent U.S. history. Occurring in March 2025, this episode raises critical questions about the use of digital tools by government officials and the risks tied to privacy in official communications.
The Signal app, launched in 2012 and maintained by the Signal Foundation, is widely praised for its focus on data protection. Featuring end-to-end encryption, it ensures that only conversation participants can access message content, a feature that has attracted users like journalists, activists, and even military personnel worldwide. In the U.S. case, the inclusion of figures such as the vice president and other leaders in the group accessed by Goldberg demonstrates how a tool designed for secrecy can become a vulnerability when mishandled. The messages, which detailed military strategies, came to light amid escalating tensions in the Middle East.
The fallout was immediate. Experts emphasized that the flaw lay not in the technology itself but in the absence of strict protocols for using apps in sensitive discussions. While the Trump administration has yet to issue an official statement as of this report’s closure, the incident is already drawing comparisons to past leaks, such as Edward Snowden’s 2013 revelations. However, this exposure stands out due to its accidental nature, stemming not from cyberattacks or hacking but from a monumental human error.

- Timeline of the Signal leak:
- March 20: Jeffrey Goldberg is mistakenly added to the group.
- March 22: The journalist recognizes the messages’ sensitivity and alerts his team.
- March 24: The story breaks, sparking global repercussions.
Why Signal is the go-to for governments and conspirators
Designed to provide maximum privacy, Signal has gained traction among those seeking secure communication. Its encryption, adopted by WhatsApp in 2016, ensures that only participants can view content. Additional features, such as hiding phone numbers and self-destructing messages, enhance its appeal for those requiring discretion. It’s no wonder, then, that the app has been endorsed by figures like Elon Musk, who publicly recommended it, and used by militaries across the globe.
In Brazil, Signal also surfaced in high-stakes investigations. In 2023, the Federal Police uncovered that four Brazilian Army officers used the app to plan a coup following the 2022 elections. In a group dubbed “Copa 2022,” they discussed assassinating authorities like President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes. Using codenames like “Germany” and “Japan,” they aimed to evade detection, but the messages were retrieved, leading to their arrests in November of that year.
Signal’s adoption by governments and conspiratorial groups reflects a broader trend: privacy tools, while created with noble intent, can be exploited for controversial purposes. In the U.S., the Trump administration’s choice of Signal for military discussions underscores how the line between security and vulnerability is razor-thin. The ease of creating groups and sharing sensitive data, combined with a lack of oversight, makes Signal a fertile ground for both official strategies and illicit schemes.
A human error in a hacker-proof system
The exposure of war plans on Signal wasn’t due to a technological flaw but a basic human mistake. Jeffrey Goldberg, an experienced journalist, was added to the group through an oversight that remains unexplained. The messages included specifics about airstrikes targeting Houthi positions in Yemen, a region embroiled in conflict since 2014, when the Iran-backed rebels seized the capital, Sanaa. The involvement of Rubio and Hegseth suggests the group served as a direct channel for top-level decisions.
This incident revealed a troubling reality: even with a secure tool, inadequate training or oversight can jeopardize critical information. In recent years, the U.S. has ramped up actions against the Houthis, who control much of Yemen and frequently attack ships in the Red Sea. In January 2025, for instance, U.S. airstrikes in response to Houthi missile launches killed at least 15 fighters, per official reports. The Signal discussions, thus, unfolded amid a military escalation.
Analysts argue that the case underscores the need for more robust systems in official communications. While Signal is immune to external interception, it offers no safeguard against internal blunders, like adding an outsider to a secret group. The situation also reignites debates about governments relying on commercial apps, particularly as cybersecurity becomes a global priority.
What makes Signal both reliable and risky
Founded by the Signal Foundation, a nonprofit, the app’s mission is to protect free speech and user privacy. Its open-source code allows independent experts to verify its security, setting it apart from platforms like WhatsApp or Telegram. In 2024, Signal boasted over 40 million monthly users, a 15% rise from the previous year, driven by growing concerns over digital surveillance.
Key features that set it apart include:
- End-to-end encryption for all messages and calls.
- Self-deleting messages after a set time.
- Screenshot blocking in certain settings.
- Minimal personal data collection, with optional phone number registration.
Yet, this reliability also makes it a target for extreme uses. For the Trump administration, Signal offered secrecy amid a polarized political climate. In Brazil, coup-plotting soldiers chose it for its untraceable nature. In both instances, the app performed as intended, but users underestimated the risks of operational errors.
Global fallout from the U.S. security lapse
The leak of plans against the Houthis reverberates beyond the U.S. In Yemen, where the civil war has claimed over 150,000 lives since 2014, the news could shift conflict dynamics. The Houthis, facing a Saudi-led coalition backed by the U.S., might adapt their tactics following the exposure. In March 2025, Houthi attacks on Red Sea commercial ships had already killed three sailors, per coalition reports.
Internationally, the incident dents the Trump administration’s credibility on national security. Allies like the UK and Israel, frequent partners in Middle East operations, now question the reliability of U.S. communication channels. Meanwhile, adversaries such as Iran and Russia may seize the opportunity to criticize Washington, heightening diplomatic tensions.
Domestically, U.S. opposition demands answers. Congressional Democrats have called for hearings to investigate how such a breach occurred and what steps will follow. The episode also fuels ongoing criticism of the Trump administration’s opacity on military matters since taking office in 2025.
Similar cases reveal a pattern of controversial use
Signal’s role in sensitive situations isn’t new. Beyond Brazil’s 2023 case, other incidents highlight its recurring presence in high-stakes contexts. In 2021, Hong Kong activists used Signal to organize protests against China’s national security law, leveraging its anti-surveillance features. In 2022, Ukrainian officials relied on it to coordinate defenses during Russia’s invasion, dodging interception.
The U.S. case, however, stands out for its severity. Unlike activists or wartime militaries, the Trump administration used Signal in a supposedly controlled setting, yet failed to safeguard critical data. Goldberg’s brief access to the group allowed strategic details to reach the public—something preventable with more secure official channels.
Here are notable instances of Signal’s use:
- Hong Kong (2021): Protest coordination against national security laws.
- Ukraine (2022): Military communication in war’s early stages.
- Brazil (2023): Coup planning by Army officers.
- United States (2025): War plans against Houthis.
Signal’s future post-scandal
Following the U.S. incident, Signal faces a paradoxical moment. Its reputation as a secure tool remains intact, as the leak stemmed from user error, not technical failure. Yet, its association with controversial government use could deter everyday users wary of ties to risky activities. In 2024, Signal saw a 10-million-download surge after privacy scandals hit rivals like Telegram.
Experts suggest the app’s future hinges on public perception. While activists and journalists will likely continue relying on its encryption, governments may hesitate without stricter protocols. In the U.S., the Pentagon is exploring internal alternatives for classified communications, reducing dependence on external tools.
In Brazil, the coup case prompted tighter app oversight. In 2024, the Federal Police bolstered its digital intelligence units, recovering over 500 encrypted messages in various probes. The takeaway from both the Brazilian and U.S. cases is evident: a tool’s security depends as much on its tech as on its users.

In a shocking incident that stunned national security experts, the Signal messaging app, renowned for its advanced encryption, became the focal point of a controversy involving the Trump administration. High-ranking officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, used the platform to discuss confidential war plans targeting Houthi rebels in Yemen. The revelation surfaced after Jeffrey Goldberg, editor-in-chief of The Atlantic, was inadvertently added to a group exchanging top-secret messages, exposing what has been labeled one of the most significant security breaches in recent U.S. history. Occurring in March 2025, this episode raises critical questions about the use of digital tools by government officials and the risks tied to privacy in official communications.
The Signal app, launched in 2012 and maintained by the Signal Foundation, is widely praised for its focus on data protection. Featuring end-to-end encryption, it ensures that only conversation participants can access message content, a feature that has attracted users like journalists, activists, and even military personnel worldwide. In the U.S. case, the inclusion of figures such as the vice president and other leaders in the group accessed by Goldberg demonstrates how a tool designed for secrecy can become a vulnerability when mishandled. The messages, which detailed military strategies, came to light amid escalating tensions in the Middle East.
The fallout was immediate. Experts emphasized that the flaw lay not in the technology itself but in the absence of strict protocols for using apps in sensitive discussions. While the Trump administration has yet to issue an official statement as of this report’s closure, the incident is already drawing comparisons to past leaks, such as Edward Snowden’s 2013 revelations. However, this exposure stands out due to its accidental nature, stemming not from cyberattacks or hacking but from a monumental human error.

- Timeline of the Signal leak:
- March 20: Jeffrey Goldberg is mistakenly added to the group.
- March 22: The journalist recognizes the messages’ sensitivity and alerts his team.
- March 24: The story breaks, sparking global repercussions.
Why Signal is the go-to for governments and conspirators
Designed to provide maximum privacy, Signal has gained traction among those seeking secure communication. Its encryption, adopted by WhatsApp in 2016, ensures that only participants can view content. Additional features, such as hiding phone numbers and self-destructing messages, enhance its appeal for those requiring discretion. It’s no wonder, then, that the app has been endorsed by figures like Elon Musk, who publicly recommended it, and used by militaries across the globe.
In Brazil, Signal also surfaced in high-stakes investigations. In 2023, the Federal Police uncovered that four Brazilian Army officers used the app to plan a coup following the 2022 elections. In a group dubbed “Copa 2022,” they discussed assassinating authorities like President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes. Using codenames like “Germany” and “Japan,” they aimed to evade detection, but the messages were retrieved, leading to their arrests in November of that year.
Signal’s adoption by governments and conspiratorial groups reflects a broader trend: privacy tools, while created with noble intent, can be exploited for controversial purposes. In the U.S., the Trump administration’s choice of Signal for military discussions underscores how the line between security and vulnerability is razor-thin. The ease of creating groups and sharing sensitive data, combined with a lack of oversight, makes Signal a fertile ground for both official strategies and illicit schemes.
A human error in a hacker-proof system
The exposure of war plans on Signal wasn’t due to a technological flaw but a basic human mistake. Jeffrey Goldberg, an experienced journalist, was added to the group through an oversight that remains unexplained. The messages included specifics about airstrikes targeting Houthi positions in Yemen, a region embroiled in conflict since 2014, when the Iran-backed rebels seized the capital, Sanaa. The involvement of Rubio and Hegseth suggests the group served as a direct channel for top-level decisions.
This incident revealed a troubling reality: even with a secure tool, inadequate training or oversight can jeopardize critical information. In recent years, the U.S. has ramped up actions against the Houthis, who control much of Yemen and frequently attack ships in the Red Sea. In January 2025, for instance, U.S. airstrikes in response to Houthi missile launches killed at least 15 fighters, per official reports. The Signal discussions, thus, unfolded amid a military escalation.
Analysts argue that the case underscores the need for more robust systems in official communications. While Signal is immune to external interception, it offers no safeguard against internal blunders, like adding an outsider to a secret group. The situation also reignites debates about governments relying on commercial apps, particularly as cybersecurity becomes a global priority.
What makes Signal both reliable and risky
Founded by the Signal Foundation, a nonprofit, the app’s mission is to protect free speech and user privacy. Its open-source code allows independent experts to verify its security, setting it apart from platforms like WhatsApp or Telegram. In 2024, Signal boasted over 40 million monthly users, a 15% rise from the previous year, driven by growing concerns over digital surveillance.
Key features that set it apart include:
- End-to-end encryption for all messages and calls.
- Self-deleting messages after a set time.
- Screenshot blocking in certain settings.
- Minimal personal data collection, with optional phone number registration.
Yet, this reliability also makes it a target for extreme uses. For the Trump administration, Signal offered secrecy amid a polarized political climate. In Brazil, coup-plotting soldiers chose it for its untraceable nature. In both instances, the app performed as intended, but users underestimated the risks of operational errors.
Global fallout from the U.S. security lapse
The leak of plans against the Houthis reverberates beyond the U.S. In Yemen, where the civil war has claimed over 150,000 lives since 2014, the news could shift conflict dynamics. The Houthis, facing a Saudi-led coalition backed by the U.S., might adapt their tactics following the exposure. In March 2025, Houthi attacks on Red Sea commercial ships had already killed three sailors, per coalition reports.
Internationally, the incident dents the Trump administration’s credibility on national security. Allies like the UK and Israel, frequent partners in Middle East operations, now question the reliability of U.S. communication channels. Meanwhile, adversaries such as Iran and Russia may seize the opportunity to criticize Washington, heightening diplomatic tensions.
Domestically, U.S. opposition demands answers. Congressional Democrats have called for hearings to investigate how such a breach occurred and what steps will follow. The episode also fuels ongoing criticism of the Trump administration’s opacity on military matters since taking office in 2025.
Similar cases reveal a pattern of controversial use
Signal’s role in sensitive situations isn’t new. Beyond Brazil’s 2023 case, other incidents highlight its recurring presence in high-stakes contexts. In 2021, Hong Kong activists used Signal to organize protests against China’s national security law, leveraging its anti-surveillance features. In 2022, Ukrainian officials relied on it to coordinate defenses during Russia’s invasion, dodging interception.
The U.S. case, however, stands out for its severity. Unlike activists or wartime militaries, the Trump administration used Signal in a supposedly controlled setting, yet failed to safeguard critical data. Goldberg’s brief access to the group allowed strategic details to reach the public—something preventable with more secure official channels.
Here are notable instances of Signal’s use:
- Hong Kong (2021): Protest coordination against national security laws.
- Ukraine (2022): Military communication in war’s early stages.
- Brazil (2023): Coup planning by Army officers.
- United States (2025): War plans against Houthis.
Signal’s future post-scandal
Following the U.S. incident, Signal faces a paradoxical moment. Its reputation as a secure tool remains intact, as the leak stemmed from user error, not technical failure. Yet, its association with controversial government use could deter everyday users wary of ties to risky activities. In 2024, Signal saw a 10-million-download surge after privacy scandals hit rivals like Telegram.
Experts suggest the app’s future hinges on public perception. While activists and journalists will likely continue relying on its encryption, governments may hesitate without stricter protocols. In the U.S., the Pentagon is exploring internal alternatives for classified communications, reducing dependence on external tools.
In Brazil, the coup case prompted tighter app oversight. In 2024, the Federal Police bolstered its digital intelligence units, recovering over 500 encrypted messages in various probes. The takeaway from both the Brazilian and U.S. cases is evident: a tool’s security depends as much on its tech as on its users.
